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In its 2014 decision in Spitz v. Proven Winners,1 the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that, under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act 
(“ITSA”),2 a plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment was displaced by 
her claim of trade secret misappropriation (“TSM”) in the absence of a 
finding that the business information at issue amounted to a trade 
secret.3  
Whether intended or not, this was a radical decision on the issue 
of TSM and displacement of common-law claims. The Spitz holding 
has likely made the Seventh Circuit, and particularly Illinois, less 
friendly to businesses seeking trade secret protection for their know-
how. Trade secrets include confidential customer lists, chemical 
                                                 
∗ J.D. (Certificate in Intellectual Property Law), May 2016, Chicago-Kent 
College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; M.A. (Honors), Public Policy, 
Northwestern University (2007); B.S. (Highest Honors), Computer Science, DePaul 
University (2005). The author would like to thank Hal Morris, Kelsey Weyhing, 
Emily Linehan, Stephen Pigozzi, and Matthew Smart. 
1 Spitz v. Proven Winners N.A., LLC, 759 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2014). 
2 765 ILCS 1065/1. 
3 Spitz, 759 F.3d at 724. 
1
Onley: A Proposal for Eliminating Adjudicative Loopholes Under Statutory
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2016
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 11, Issue 2                        Spring 2016 
 
334 
formulas, and manufacturing processes4 as well as business methods 
and software, which are increasingly more difficult to protect under 
federal patent law.5  
Today, 70% of business value is derived from intangible assets, 
which include intellectual property.6 Trade secrets and patents are 
complementary forms of intellectual property protection, and inventors 
who are not ready to publicly disclose business methods in a patent 
application often opt for trade secret protection. Furthermore, a trade 
secret is not a binary construct—the question of whether a trade secret 
exists cannot be answered with a simple “yes” or “no.”  
Rather, it is proper to think of proprietary business information as 
falling in one of three categories: proper trade secrets, “valuable and 
proprietary” information that does not quite fall under the definition of 
trade secrets,7 and information that is widely known to the public and 
therefore does not constitute a trade secret.8 The second category of 
business assets is the least likely to be adequately protected under the 
current statutory law of trade secrets in the Seventh Circuit, such as 
the ITSA.  
 The ITSA, which is the Illinois version of the 1979 Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act9 (“UTSA” or “Uniform Act”), became effective in 
                                                 
4 Alderson v. U.S., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2010) aff'd, 686 
F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 1–1 MILARAM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.09). 
5 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (holding that 
method and software claims were unpatentable). 
6 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS xxvii 
(Lanning Bryer & Melvin Simensky eds., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002). 
7 Abanco Int’l, Inc. v. Guestlogix Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 779, 782 (N.D. Ill. 
2007) (“I cannot equate the complaint's description of the information as ‘valuable 
and proprietary’ with the definition of trade secrets under the ITSA at defendant's 
request.”). 
8 Spitz v. Proven Winners N.A., LLC, 969 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 
2013), aff'd, 759 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Information that is generally known 
within an industry, even if not in the public at large, as well as information that can 
be readily duplicated without considerable time, effort, or expense, is not a trade 
secret.”). 
9 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS, 
2
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1988. Its objective was to achieve greater uniformity among the states. 
The goal of the Illinois Act, as with the Uniform Act, was “to displace 
conflicting tort, restitutionary law, unfair competition, and other 
Illinois laws that provide civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade 
secret.”10 Since the introduction of the Uniform Act and its adoption 
by all three states within the Seventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals has oscillated between supporting the free flow of 
information and unrestrained competition and helping businesses 
safeguard and capitalize on their know-how.11 Unfortunately, the 
Seventh Circuit has not provided much guidance to reconcile its 
holdings as to the rules on displacement of common-law claims by the 
trade secret misappropriation claims when business information at 
issue, though “valuable and proprietary”,12 does not rise to the level of 
a trade secret.  
Legal certainty is important to creating a business-friendly climate 
and attracting innovation. This article proposes a framework for 
determining whether and to what extent trade secret misappropriation 
claims should displace common law claims. This approach includes 
four proposed rules.  
First, if the claim arises in the law of contract or if the plaintiff 
could recover on a theory of quasi-contract, the claim should not be 
displaced unless expressly prohibited by statute. Claims that arise in 
the law of contract include tortious interference with contract, breach 
of fiduciary duty, and breach of a confidentiality agreement. Quasi-
contract claims include unjust enrichment. 
Second, in deciding whether the information at issue is a trade 
secret, courts should supplement the statutory definition with the 
state’s common-law analysis. 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf (last 
visited July 5, 2016) [hereinafter NATIONAL CONFERENCE]. 
10 765 ILCS 1065/8. 
11 See, e.g., Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 
1263 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that common-law claims were displaced); cf. Hecny 
Transp., Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2005) (allowing common-law claims). 
12 Abanco Int’l, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d at 782. 
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Third, if the information at issue is a trade secret, there may still 
be an actionable wrong that does not fall under the definition of 
misappropriation. In such cases, the plaintiff should be able to recover 
on alternative theories. 
Finally, the statutory term “displace” should be construed as 
“preempt,” meaning “handle or acquire beforehand to the exclusion of 
others,” or “take precedence over,”13 rather than “preclude,” or “make 
impossible by necessary consequence.”1415 Thus, displacement of 
common-law claims should require: (1) a trade secret; and (2) a 
finding of no misappropriation of the trade secret. Otherwise, the 
plaintiff may be left without any remedy by simply pleading TSM. 
It follows from the rules proposed here that dismissal or 
adjudication of common law claims on summary judgment is 
inappropriate when based solely on statutory language. After all, if 
there is no trade secret, then nothing can displace the common law 
claims, which in such instances should be independently adjudicated.  
 Part I sets up the legal context for the issue, explaining the 
common law elements of trade secret misappropriation and statutory 
common law claims. Part II presents the history and current status of 
the state Uniform Trade Secrets Acts16 adopted by Illinois, Wisconsin, 
and Indiana. Part III presents an analysis of post-UTSA Seventh 
Circuit decisions and the questions they left unanswered. Building on 
these considerations and against the historical background of trade 
secret legislation and litigation in the Seventh Circuit, Part IV 
proposes a procedure for adjudicating common law claims that are 
brought with the claims of trade secret misappropriation.  
 
                                                 
13 PREEMPT, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage. 
14 PRECLUDE, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary. 
15 For clarity, the terms “preclude” and “preempt” discussed here should not be 
confused with the concept of preemption of state law by federal law. 
16 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 9. 
4
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PART I: LEGAL CONTEXT 
 
 This section presents an overview, within a historical context, of 
the elements required in claims of trade secret misappropriation. 
 Trade secret is the most litigated form of intellectual property 
protection17 and has been recognized in U.S. jurisprudence since the 
mid-nineteenth century.18 It is defined as business information that is 
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford the holder an actual or 
potential economic advantage over others.19 Initially, the primary 
function of trade secret misappropriation law was to prevent third 
parties from unfairly benefiting from the know-how of the trade secret 
holder by providing remedies for breach of confidence and unjust 
enrichment.20 Today, trade secret law continues to punish the same 
categories of behavior: breach of duty and bad acts.21 To the extent 
that it seeks to prevent breach of duty, the law of trade secrets aims to 
promote investment in research22 and encourage innovation through 
the practice of trade secret protection and the resulting necessary 
disclosure to employees, contractors, and licensees.23 To the extent 
that the law of trade secrets seeks to punish bad acts, it serves as a 
vehicle for preventing unjust enrichment by recognizing an interest in 
commercial privacy,24 which is generally attenuated only by 
heightened government interest, as in closely regulated industries.25  
                                                 
17 Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). 




21 Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A 
Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 73 
(1999). 
22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 
1995). 
23 Id. 
24 Chiappetta, supra note 21.  
25 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 691 (1987). 
5
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To state a claim for misappropriation of a trade secret, the 
following elements are required: (1) a trade secret; (2) 
misappropriation of the trade secret; and (3) a showing that the owner 
of the trade secret was damaged by the misappropriation.26   
 
A. What Constitutes a Trade Secret? 
 
Courts within the Seventh Circuit determine what falls within the 
definition of a trade secret27 by applying the test from section 757 of 
the Restatement (First) of Torts.28 However, these courts recognize 
that it is not necessary that the information at issue meet all factors.29 
The factors generally focus on different aspects of secrecy of the 
information at issue.30 First, courts evaluate the extent to which 
information is known outside the business31 because the law of trade 
secrets is understood to “preclude[] trade secret protection for 
information generally known or understood within an industry even if 
not to the public at large.”32 The second factor is the extent to which 
confidential information is known to employees and others within the 
organization,33 such as contractors. Courts also evaluate the extent to 
which the owner of the alleged trade secret attempted to protect the 
information34 and the ease with which others could acquire the 
                                                 
26 Covenant Aviation Security, LLC v. Berry, 15 F.Supp.3d 813 (N.D. Ill. 
2014). 
27 Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 722 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. (“The language of the Act itself makes no reference to these factors as 
independent requirements for trade secret status, and Illinois case law imposes no 
such requirement that each factor weigh in favor of the plaintiff.”); see also ILG 
Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 396 (1971). 
30 Learning Curve Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d at 722. 
31 Id.; see also Computer Associates Int’l v. Quest Software, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 
2d 688, 695 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
32 Learning Curve Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d at 722. 
33 Computer Associates Int’l, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 695. 
34 Id. 
6
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information.35 Finally, courts look at the value of information to 
competitors36 and the amount of time, money, and effort expended in 
developing the information.37 Thus, a total of six factors inform the 
analysis. 
Additionally, when the plaintiff pleads trade secret 
misappropriation, courts within the Seventh Circuit generally find it 
sufficient that the plaintiff identify “specific types of business 
information” and “specific efforts to protect the business 
information.”38 Crucially, the Seventh Circuit noted that the existence 
of a trade secret is ordinarily a question of fact39 because the existence 
of a trade secret is not obvious and requires an ad-hoc evaluation of all 
the surrounding circumstances.40 As a result, the question of whether 
the information amounts to a trade secret should not be disposed of on 
summary judgment or motions for judgment as a matter of law. 
 
B. What Constitutes Misappropriation of Trade Secrets? 
 
Courts within the Seventh Circuit are generally plaintiff-friendly 
when construing pleadings of misappropriation. For example, when 
the plaintiff pleads misappropriation, the fact that the plaintiff’s 




38 Covenant Aviation Sec., LLC, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 818. 
39 Learning Curve Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d at 723 n.2. citing Nilssen v. Motorola, 
Inc., 963 F.Supp. 664, 675 (N.D. Ill.1997) (applying Illinois law); Penalty Kick 
Mgm't Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th Cir.2003) (applying 
Georgia law); Pate v. Nat'l Fund Raising Consultants, Inc., 20 F.3d 341, 344 (8th 
Cir.1994) (applying Colorado law); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Roxen Serv., Inc., 813 
F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir.1987) (applying New York law); 1 Melvin F. Jager, TRADE 
SECRETS LAW § 5.2, at 5–3 (2002); 2 Gregory E. Upchurch, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LITIGATION GUIDE: PATENTS & TRADE SECRETS § 16.03, at 16–18 (2002). 
40 Id. (citing Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark–Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 289 (5th 
Cir.1978)). 
7
Onley: A Proposal for Eliminating Adjudicative Loopholes Under Statutory
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2016
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 11, Issue 2                        Spring 2016 
 
340 
allegations of misappropriation are based on information and belief are 
not sufficient to dismiss the complaint.41  
Furthermore, plaintiffs are not required to show use of a trade 
secret in every case.42 In fact, trade secret misappropriation can be 
shown one of three ways: (1) by improper acquisition; (2) by 
unauthorized disclosure; or (3) by unauthorized use.43 Further, under 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine, courts may infer that unauthorized 
use took place simply “based on a defendant’s prior positions with 
plaintiff, the information to which they had access and the nature of 
their work for their new employer.”44 Disclosure of trade secrets is 
considered inevitable unless the new employer takes specific actions 
to prevent the new hire from using the former employer’s trade 
secrets.45 
In summary, courts within the Seventh Circuit have expressed the 
view that “[b]ecause direct evidence of misappropriation of trade 
secrets is typically not available, a plaintiff can rely on circumstantial 
evidence to prove misappropriation.”46 As a result, the question of 
whether misappropriation took place should not be disposed of on 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for judgment as a 
matter of law. 
 
C. The Common Law: Breach-of-Duty and “Bad Act” Claims 
 
This section delineates the elements of common-law claims that 
are commonly brought together with statutory trade secret claims and 
discusses the circumstances where trial and appellate courts allowed 
common-law claims. These claims include breach of fiduciary duty, 
                                                 
41Covenant Aviation Sec., LLC, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 819. 
42 Liebert Corp. v. Mazur, 827 N.E.2d 909, 925 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2005). 
43 Covenant Aviation Security, LLC, 15 F. Supp.3d at 813. 
44 Id. at 819. 
45 RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 200 F. Supp. 2d 916, 923 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citing 
PepsiCo v. Redmond, 1996 WL 3965 *17–20 (N.D. Ill.1996)). 
46 Id.; accord Tempco Elec. Heater Corp. v. Temperature Engr. Co., 02 C 
3572, 2004 WL 1254134, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2004). 
8
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diversion of corporate opportunities, unjust enrichment, unfair 
competition, and conversion. Courts and commentators alike have 
noted that the key to determining whether the common law claims 
should be displaced is “to analyze each claim and its relationship to 
the facts or conduct of the trade secret claim.”47  
 
1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
 
Claims of trade secret misappropriation often arise when 
proprietary information is misused by insiders who have a duty of 
loyalty to the employer, such as employees, officers, and directors of 
the company holding a trade secret.48 The term “duty” generally 
implies that an individual must conduct himself in a particular manner 
toward those to whom the duty is owed.49  
To set out a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must 
allege facts establishing: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty on the 
defendant’s part; (2) the defendant’s breach of the duty; and (3) 
damages proximately resulting from the breach.50 With respect to the 
first prong, there are two kinds of fiduciary relationships: a fiduciary 
relationship as a matter of law and a fiduciary relationship as a matter 
of fact.51 An agent and a principal are in a fiduciary relationship as a 
matter of law.52 However, even in the absence of evidence that the 
defendant ever agreed to be the plaintiff’s agent, as may be the case in 
licensing negotiations, a fiduciary relationship may still exist if “one 
                                                 
47 Lucini Italia Co. v. Grappolini, 231 F. Supp. 2d 764, 768 (N.D. Ill. 2002); 
see also Olfe v. Gordon, 93 Wis.2d 173, 186, 286 N.W.2d 573, 579 (1980) 
(emphasis added). 
48 Lawlor v. N. Am. Corp. of Illinois, 983 N.E.2d 414, 433 (Ill. 2012) 
(“Employees as well as officers and directors owe a duty of loyalty to their 
employer. . . . Accordingly, a fiduciary cannot act inconsistently with his agency or 
trust and cannot solicit his employer's customers for himself.”). 
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965). 
50 Lucini Italia Co., 231 F. Supp. 2d 764, 770 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citing Romanek 
v. Connelly, 753 N.E.2d 1062, 1072 (2001)). 
51 Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 948 N.E.2d 132 (2011). 
52 Tummelson v. White, 47 N.E.3d 579 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 2015). 
9
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party reposes special trust and confidence in another[,] who accepts 
that trust and confidence and thereby gains superiority and influence 
over the subservient party.”53  
 Importantly, the existence of a trade secret is not a prerequisite for 
claims of breach of duty. For instance, a comment to the Uniform Act 
states, and the Seventh Circuit agrees, that the Act does not apply “to 
duties imposed by law that are not dependent upon the existence of 
competitively significant secret information, like an agent’s duty of 
loyalty to his or her principal.”54 
 
2. Diversion of Corporate Opportunities 
 
Courts within the Seventh Circuit have found that diversion, or 
usurpation, of corporate opportunities occurs when a fiduciary takes 
advantage of a business opportunity developed through the use of 
corporate assets.55 This activity may give rise to breach-of-duty claims 
under the second prong of the test for breaching fiduciary duty, 
discussed supra.56 Qualifying activities may include solicitation for 
the actor’s own benefit of business or customers before leaving the 
company, failure to inform the company, and unauthorized use of the 
company’s facilities or resources.57 Diverting business away from a 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Hecny Transp., Inc., 430 F.3d at 405 (emphasis added); see also Lucini Italia 
Co., 231 F. Supp. 2d 764, 770 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citing Thermodyne Food Serv. Prod., 
Inc., v. McDonald's Corp., 940 F.Supp. 1300, 1309) (N.D. Ill.1996) (“In a situation 
where the alleged breach of duty does not rely on the misappropriation of a trade 
secret, the claim survives.”). 
55 Anest v. Audino, 773 N.E.2d 202, 210 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 2002) (citing 
Dremco, Inc. v. South Chapel Hill Gardens, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 501 (1995)). 
56 Id. 
57 Star Forge, Inc. v. F.C. Mason Co., 2014 IL App 2d 130527-U, ¶ 18 (citing 
Cooper Linse Hallman Capital Management, Inc. v. Hallman, 856 N.E.2d 585 
(2006) (“[F]iduciaries have been found to have breached their duty of loyalty where 
they solicited for their own benefit the business of even one customer before leaving 
the company, used the company's facilities or resources to assist them in competing 
with the company, or failed to inform the company that they were competing with 
the company or engaging in other fiduciary breaches.”)). 
10
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company is considered a breach of fiduciary duty even if the actor’s 
efforts are not compensated58 or if the alleged competitors are not in 
the same line of business as the plaintiff.59 
 
3. Unjust Enrichment 
  
An unjust enrichment claim must allege that: (1) the defendant 
has “unjustly retained a benefit to the plaintiff’s detriment” and (2) the 
defendant’s “retention of the benefit violates the fundamental 
principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.”60 In one case, 
where a consultant allegedly misappropriated the plaintiff’s marketing 
plans and usurped a corporate opportunity created by an olive oil seller 
by breaching an exclusive supplier agreement,61 the District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois found that the claim of unjust 
enrichment was not preempted to the extent it relied on the usurpation 
of corporate opportunity rather than misappropriation of marketing 
plans.62 
 
4. Unfair Competition 
 
Unfair competition is a broad, fact-specific63 category of 
dishonest64 conduct that is injurious to the plaintiff’s business.65 In the 
context of trade secrets, Indiana and Illinois courts have allowed trade 
secret plaintiffs to proceed on theories of unfair competition. 
Specifically, Indiana courts recognized two instances when claims of 
                                                 
58 Star Forge, Inc., 2014 IL App (2d) 130527-U, ¶ 18. 
59 Id. ¶ 20 (citing Anest v. Audino, 773 N.E.2d 202 (2002)). 
60 Lucini Italia Co., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 772. 
61 Id. at 769. 
62 Id. at 772 (noting that “to the extent that Lucini relies on Grappolini's alleged 
misappropriation of the confidential marketing information to show his benefit, the 
claim is preempted by the ITSA; however, to the extent that it is based on the 
usurpation of the Vegetal agreement, it survives.”). 
63 See, e.g., Adams v. Kassnel, 148 N.E.2d 818 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1958). 
64 Id. 
65 Soft-Lite Lens Co. v. Ritholz, 21 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1939). 
11
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unfair competition could survive: the use of confidential information 
that is damaging to the defendant’s former employer and passing off of 
the “goods or business of one person as that of another.”66 Similarly, 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has allowed unfair 
competition claims, acknowledging that confidential information is a 
broader category of information than trade secrets and noting that it 
would be unfair to allow defendants to compete with the plaintiffs in 
the same market by using misappropriated confidential information.67 
It is not even necessary for a finding of unfair competition for the 




 The elements of a conversion claim include the following: (1) the 
plaintiff’s right to the property in question; (2) the plaintiff’s “absolute 
and unconditional right to the immediate possession of the 
property”;69 (3) a demand for possession made to the defendant; and 
                                                 
66 Panther Brands, LLC v. Indy Racing League, LLC, 1:14-CV-00472-TWP, 
2015 WL 1396910, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2015) (“First, ‘a claim for unfair 
competition may be brought when [an] employee uses ‘trade secrets or other 
confidential information acquired in the course of his employment for his benefit or 
that of a competitor in a manner which is detrimental to his former employer.’ . . . 
Second, ‘a cause of action for unfair competition arises when there is ‘any conduct, 
the natural and probable tendency and effect of which is to deceive the public so as 
to pass off goods or business of one person as and for that of another.’”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
67 FAIP N.A., Inc. v. Sistema s.r.l., 05 C 4002, 2005 WL 3436398, at *6 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 14, 2005) (“Although encompassing trade secrets, we believe confidential 
information is a broader category of information. We are unwilling to limit the 
alleged misappropriation of confidential information to merely trade secrets . . . 
Further, we believe it is reasonable to assume that misappropriated confidential 
information, not of trade secret nature, could give Defendants an unfair advantage 
and therefore allow them to unfairly compete in the pressure washer market.”). 
68 Chicago's Pizza, Inc. v. Chicago's Pizza Fran. Ltd. USA, 893 N.E.2d 981, 
995 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2008). 
69 First Fin. Bank, N.A. v. Bauknecht, 71 F. Supp. 3d 819, 847 (C.D. Ill. 2014) 
(citing Cirrincione v. Johnson, 703 N.E.2d 67, 70 (1998)). 
12
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(4) wrongful assumption of control, dominion, or ownership over the 
property.70  
 At least one court in the Seventh Circuit, the District Court for the 
Central District of Illinois, has acknowledged that plaintiffs could 
bring claims of conversion with respect to the property that did not fall 
under the statutory definition of a trade secret.71  
 Also, Indiana and Illinois courts have found that claims of 
misappropriation of tangible media that embody trade secrets are not 
displaced if these objects have independent value.72 
 Finally, the Seventh Circuit itself has held that claims of “outright 
theft” were not displaced by the law of trade secrets even when the 
information in question included non-confidential customer identities, 
which were widely known in the trade and therefore did not amount to 
a trade secret.73 
 
PART II: STATUTORY ENACTMENTS TO DISPLACE COMMON-LAW CLAIMS 
 
Civil trade secret litigation is governed by state law.74 In 1979, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
                                                 
70 Id. 
71 Id. (“Plaintiff's conversion claim must be limited to the farm equipment 
guides, the soil maps, First Financial's collateral schedules, and other First Financial 
documents in which it is not claiming a trade secret.”). 
72 Remy, Inc. v. Tecnomatic S.P.A., 1:11-CV-00991-SEB, 2014 WL 2882855, 
at *11 (S.D. Ind. June 24, 2014) (citing Patriot Homes, Inc., 489 F.Supp.2d 865, 871 
(N.D. Ind.2007), CardioNet, Inc. v. LifeWatch Corp., Cause No. 07 C 6625, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15938, at *8,2008 WL 567223 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2008); Dick 
Corp. v. SNC–Lavalin Constructors, Inc., Cause No. 04 C 1043, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26767, at *33–34, 2004 WL 2967556 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2004)). 
73 Hecny Transp., Inc., 430 F.3d at 404. 
74 LOUIS ALTMAN & MARIA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 16:32 (4th ed. 2011), 2 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR 
COMP., TR. & MONO. § 16:32 (Westlaw) (citing Wesley-Jessen Inc. v. Reynolds, 182 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 135, 1974 WL 20197 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 
1975) (state law is applied to issue of misappropriation of trade secrets in diversity 
cases)). 
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promulgated the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.75 The goal of the 
Uniform Act was to establish a uniform and consistent treatment of 
trade secrets among the states that adopted the act.76  
The Uniform Act displaced “conflicting tort, restitutionary, and 
other [state law] providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a 
trade secret.”77 Importantly, the Uniform Act did not displace “(1) 
contractual remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a 
trade secret or (2) other civil remedies that are not based upon 
misappropriation of a trade secret; or (3) criminal remedies, whether 
or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret.”78 
 While a handful of states chose to forgo uniformity and retained 
the state common law of trade secrets,79 an overwhelming majority of 
states, including the three states within the Seventh Circuit, adopted 
the Uniform Act with few substantive revisions—Indiana did so in 
1982,80 Wisconsin in 1985,81 and Illinois in 1988.82 All three state 
statutes retain the Uniform Act language maintaining that the states’ 
laws do not displace contractual remedies and criminal remedies.83  
 As to displacement of civil tort-based claims and equitable 
remedies, state legislation is very similar to the UTSA but for two 
provisions. First, while Illinois and Wisconsin are consistent with the 
Uniform Act in displacing civil remedies that are not based on trade 
secret misappropriation,84 Indiana law displaces “all conflicting law of 
this state pertaining to the misappropriation of trade secrets, except 
                                                 
75 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). 
76 Peter J. Boyer, Preemption of Business Torts under the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, AM. BAR ASS’N, (Feb. 29, 2013), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/ 
committees/businesstorts/articles/winter2013-0213-preemption-business-torts-
uniform-trade-secrets-act.html. 
77 UTSA § 7(a) (emphasis added). 
78 § 7(b) (emphasis added). 
79 See Boyer, supra note 76 (New York and Massachusetts).  
80 IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3-1. 
81 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90. 
82 765 ILCS § 1065/1. 
83 § 1065/8; § 134.90 6(b); § 24-2-3-1. 
84 § 1065/8; § 134.90 6(b) 
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contract law and criminal law.”85 Second, the Illinois and Wisconsin 
statutes differ on the extent to which they expressly address 
displacement of civil remedies. The Wisconsin statute displaces 
“conflicting tort law, restitutionary law and any other law of this state 
providing a civil remedy for misappropriation of a trade secret.”86 The 
Illinois statute, in addition to the above, expressly displaces 
restitutionary claims of unfair competition and unjust enrichment.87 
 The adjudicative procedure proposed in this article accounts for 
the differences in state law with respect to displacement of these 
claims. For example, Illinois and Wisconsin likely intended to preempt 
rather than preclude restitutionary claims, because even though 
Wisconsin appears to displace restitutionary claims, it does so only 
with respect to damages.88 Further, all three states adopted UTSA 
definitions of a trade secret with some modifications. For instance, 
under Indiana and Wisconsin law: 
 
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, 
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or 
process, that: (1) derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons 
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; 
and (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.89 
 
 Illinois adopted a substantially similar statutory definition but 
broadened the definition of a trade secret to include “technical or non-
technical data . . . [including a] drawing, [. . .] financial data, or list of 
                                                 
85 § 24-2-3-1 (emphasis added). 
86 § 134.90 6(a). 
87 § 1065/8.  
88 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (“Damages may include both the actual loss 
caused by the violation and unjust enrichment caused by the violation that is not 
taken into account in computing actual loss.”). 
89 § 24-2-3-2 (West); see also § 134.90 (1)(c) (a substantively identical 
definition). 
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actual or potential customers or suppliers.”90  In addition, Illinois 
qualified the requirement of secrecy by stating that the information 
subject to protection must actually be “sufficiently secret.”91 
Similarly, all three states adopted virtually identical definitions of 
trade secret misappropriation:  
 
“Misappropriation” means: (1) acquisition of a trade secret of 
another by a person who knows or has reason to know that 
the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (2) 
disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express 
or implied consent by a person who: (A) used improper 
means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; (B) at the 
time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his 
knowledge of the trade secret was: (i) derived from or 
through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire 
it; (ii) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to 
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (iii) derived from or 
through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking 
relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C) before a 
material change of his position, knew or had reason to know 
that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been 
acquired by accident or mistake.92  
 
Finally, all three statutes require two findings in order to recover 
damages: that the information at issue was a trade secret and that the 
trade secret was misappropriated.93 The remedies available for trade 
secret misappropriation vary slightly among the states and include 
injunctive relief,94 damages,95 and payment of the plaintiff’s attorney’s 
                                                 
90 § 1065/2. 
91 Id. 
92 § 24-2-3-2 (West); § 134.90 (2); § 1065/2. 
93 See, e.g., MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW, § 31:1 (2016), 2 TRADE 
SECRETS LAW § 31:1 (Westlaw). 
94 § 1065/3; § 134.90(3) (West); § 24-2-3-3 (West).  
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fees for “willful and malicious misappropriation” or bad-faith motions 
to terminate an injunction.96  
 
PART III: POST-UNIFORM ACT SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS ON 
COMMON-LAW CLAIM DISPLACEMENT 
 
A. Spitz v. Proven Winners97 
 
In Spitz, the plaintiff, a marketing copywriter in the horticultural 
industry, developed a marketing concept for the defendant, a 
marketing agency.98 Part of the marketing concept included the 
plaintiff’s idea for marketing certain plants as pet-safe.99 The plaintiff 
later expanded the concept to include toxicity testing.100 She verbally 
presented the idea to the defendant, repeatedly asked the defendant to 
keep the plans confidential, and eventually executed a non-disclosure 
agreement.101 The defendant subsequently developed and marketed a 
list of pet-safe plants, which it claimed were gathered from public 
sources, such as the Humane Society,102 and used the indicator “pet-
safe” on product labels without compensating the plaintiff.103  
The plaintiff brought multiple claims, including trade secret 
misappropriation under the ITSA, quantum meruit, and unjust 
enrichment. The district court found on summary judgment that the 
plaintiff’s idea for pet-safe plants was not a trade secret104 because the 
information was generally known within the industry and because the 
                                                                                                                   
95 § 1065/4; § 134.90(4) (West) (restitutionary and punitive damages); § 24-2-
3-4 (West). 
96 § 1065/5; § 24-2-3-5 (West). 
97 Spitz, 759 F.3d . 




102 Spitz, 969 F. Supp. at 1001. 
103 Id. at 1003. 
104 Spitz, 759 F.3d at 733; Spitz, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. 
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plaintiff did not show evidence that she provided to the defendant a list 
of pet-friendly plants that was more than what the defendant could 
have gathered from public sources.105 The court also noted that the 
non-disclosure agreement did not specifically refer to the idea of pet-
safe horticultural practices.106 Likewise, the district court dismissed 
the plaintiff’s claims of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.107 The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed and noted that restitutionary claims of unjust 
enrichment and quantum meruit were displaced by the ITSA.108  
The Seventh Circuit relied on an Illinois appellate court’s 
decision, where the court affirmed, on statutory grounds, the dismissal 
of restitutionary common law claims on summary judgment after it 
found that the information at issue was not a trade secret.109 However, 
the Seventh Circuit failed to take into account an important distinction: 
the Illinois appellate court, in addition to considering the statutory 
definition of a trade secret, considered the six common law factors 
when it determined on the record that the plaintiff’s product concept 
did not amount to a trade secret.110 On the other hand, in Spitz, the 
district court concluded that the plaintiff’s marketing plan was not a 
                                                 
105 Spitz, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. 
106 Id. at 1003. 
107 Id. at 1008 (“Even if it can be inferred from this fact that plaintiff's idea had 
value, evidence does not support that PW relied on work of plaintiff—other than that 
previously paid for and plaintiff's publicly available article—in designating pet-
friendly or non-harmful plants. Plaintiff has not shown that she provided valuable 
services that were not compensated.”). 
108 Spitz, 759 F.3d at 733. 
109 Id. (citing Pope v. Alberto–Culver Co., 694 N.E.2d 615, 619 (1998) 
(“Illinois courts have read the preemptive language in the ITSA to cover claims that 
are essentially claims of trade secret misappropriation, even when the alleged “trade 
secret” does not fall within the Act's definition.”)). 
110 Pope, 694 N.E.2d at 618 (“The extent to which the information is known 
outside of [plaintiff's] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and 
others involved in [plaintiff's] business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to 
guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to 
his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing 
the information; [and] (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be 
properly acquired or duplicated by others.”). 
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trade secret merely because it was based on information generally 
known within the industry.111  
Even assuming that the ITSA intended for restitutionary common 
law claims to stand or fall with the claim of trade secret 
misappropriation, greater legal certainty could have been achieved by 
remanding the Spitz case for re-adjudication of the ITSA claim under 
the six-factor test and subsequent reconsideration of the common law 
claims. 
 
B. Other Notable Decisions 
 
Scholarly literature posits that the issue of whether other claims 
should be displaced when the plaintiff argues trade secret 
misappropriation has two sub-questions, both of which should be 
addressed: first, whether it is irrelevant that the information at issue is 
not a trade secret; and, second, whether common law claims should be 
precluded rather than preempted.112  
An affirmative answer to both questions (such as in the Spitz 
holding), even if these questions are not expressly articulated in 
judicial opinions, represents an approach least friendly to owners of 
commercial know-how because plaintiffs may be left without a 
remedy if they plead but do not adequately prove trade secret 
misappropriation.113 As illustrated by the cases discussed below, the 
Seventh Circuit has not adopted a consistent analytical framework for 
deciding these cases. 
In 1992, the Seventh Circuit held that a litigant in Composite 
Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, whose know-how did not 
amount to a trade secret, could not prevail on common law claims of 
                                                 
111 Spitz, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. 
112 See generally, Warrington S. Parker III & Daniel D. Justice, The Differing 
Approaches to Preemption Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 49 TORT TR. & 
INS. PRAC. L.J. 645, 662 (2014). 
113 Gregory D. Snell, An Employee Stole Your Trade Secrets but You Cannot 
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unfair competition and breach of fiduciary duty.114 The court noted 
that, “unless defendants misappropriated a statutory trade secret, they 
did no legal wrong.”115 Composite Marine Propellers, a product 
designer and manufacturer, sued former employees of its supplier, 
which had contractually promised to refrain from competition and use 
of the manufacturer’s trade secrets.116 Van Der Woude and other 
employees subsequently left the supplier to establish their own 
company, obtained a patent on a marine propeller, and sued Composite 
Marine Propellers for patent infringement.117 Composite Marine 
Propellers contended that Van Der Woude used its trade secrets in 
obtaining a patent. The jury in the district court’s proceedings agreed, 
awarding compensatory and punitive damages.118 The Seventh Circuit, 
finding that no trade secret misappropriation occurred, set aside the 
jury verdict, holding that “Illinois . . . abolished all common law 
theories of misuse of [trade secrets].”119 The court stated that “[t]he 
punitive damages [were] based expressly on the claim of unfair 
competition”120 but “most competition is ‘unfair’ in lay terms.”121 
Thus, the court disposed of the claim of unfair competition on the 
grounds that this claim arose under the law of trade secrets. With 
regard to the claim of breach of fiduciary duty, the court found that 
fiduciary duty did not extend to employees.122  
                                                 
114 Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
115 Id. at 1265. 
116 Id. at 1264. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id.at 1265 (referencing 765 ILCS 1065/8, which states that “this Act is 
intended to displace conflicting tort, restitutionary, unfair competition, and other 
laws of this State providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.”). 
120 Id. at 1268. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 1265 (“A person free to compete against his ex-master may compete 
against the master's customers too.”) The supplier’s former employees did not have a 
non-compete agreement with the supplier. 
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Interestingly, the court also noted that “[c]laims based on unfair 
competition and breach of fiduciary duty stand or fall with those based 
on contract.”123 While this statement is consistent with the court’s 
adjudication of the claim of breach of fiduciary duty based on the law 
of contract, which the Illinois trade secrets statute allows,124 the court 
was inconsistent in classifying the claim of unfair competition as one 
related to a breach of contract between the parties but not adjudicating 
the claim independently. Had the court adopted the construction of the 
statutory term “displace” as “preempt,” the claim of unfair competition 
could have survived even on a finding that there was no trade secret 
since the court classified the claim as one arising in contract or quasi-
contract. 
Later, in IDX v. Epic Systems125 decided in 2002, the court 
deviated from its initial position on displacement of common law 
claims. There, an IDX customer disclosed confidential information to 
Epic Systems in order for the latter to duplicate IDX functionality. The 
court held that if the allegedly misappropriated information did not 
amount to a trade secret, IDX, an electronic medical records company, 
could still recover under the theory of tortious interference with 
contract. The court concluded that the theory was founded in the law 
of contract even though there was no contract between the litigants.126 
Additionally, the court found that the claim of tortious interference 
with contract was brought to enforce a confidentiality agreement, and 
this situation was not contemplated by the Wisconsin trade secrets 
statute as a trade secret law issue.127  
                                                 
123 Id. 
124 765 ILCS 1065/8. 
125 IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2002). 
126 Id. at 584 (“IDX and the Foundation (through its predecessors in interest) 
agreed to the sort of contractual remedy preserved in § 134.90(6)(b)1.”). 
127 Id. at 586 (“Even when read apart from paragraph (b), paragraph (a) deals 
only with ‘conflicting tort law’ . . . Enforcement of a non-disclosure agreement does 
not conflict with trade-secret law, and thus preventing third parties from inducing 
breach of such an agreement does not conflict with trade-secret law.”). 
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Subsequently, in Hecny Transportation, Inc v. Chu,128 the court 
went even further when it held, on public policy grounds, that 
common law claims are not displaced even when the event that gives 
rise to plaintiff’s common law claims is misappropriation of a proper 
trade secret.129 The common law claims at issue in Hecny were 
diversion of corporate opportunities, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
theft.130  
Finally, in 2012 the Seventh Circuit considered concurrent trade 
secret misappropriation and unjust enrichment claims in Fail-Safe, 
LLC v. A. O. Smith Corp.131 Similar to Spitz, the unjust enrichment 
claim was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to take the steps to 
preserve the secrecy of the information at issue.132  
In summary, it is clear that the Seventh Circuit is more likely to 
allow concurrent common law claims if they are somehow linked to a 
theory of recovery in contract or quasi-contract. However, the Seventh 
Circuit has not yet made clear the boundaries for its analysis of 
whether the information at issue is in fact a trade secret. For example, 
greater clarity could have been achieved in the cases discussed supra 
if the court had explained whether meeting certain prongs of the 
common-law trade secret test and failing others is, first, necessary and, 
second, relevant to the disposition of the claims of unjust enrichment 
and unfair competition, which are displaced by the trade secret statute 
in Illinois133 (but not in Indiana134 or Wisconsin135).  
 
C. Questions Remaining After the Seventh Circuit Decisions 
 
                                                 
128 Hecny Transp., Inc., 430 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2005). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 405. 
131 Fail-Safe, LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 674 F.3d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 2012). 
132 Id. 
133 P.A. 85-366, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988 (codified in 765 ILCS § 1065/1). 
134 IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3-1. 
135 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90. 
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Spitz may appear to represent a full-circle return to the principle 
of anti-monopolization upheld by the court twenty-two years earlier in 
Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude.136 However, in 
Composite Marine Propellers, did the court really adopt a position on 
the following: first, whether a finding of trade secret misappropriation 
is required to issue a ruling on displacement of other claims; and, 
second, the extent of the preclusive relationship between trade secret 
misappropriation claims and other common law claims?  
One could argue that the court did not do so. For example, in 
reversing the jury verdict, the court found that the plaintiff’s assets did 
not amount to trade secrets,137 as opposed to commenting on whether a 
finding of trade secret misappropriation was required to dismiss other 
claims. Also, the court in Composite Marine Propellers moved past 
the issue of displacement by adjudicating the common law claims 
when it found that the plaintiff’s "[c]laims based on unfair competition 
and breach of fiduciary duty stand or fall with those based on 
contract."138 Arguably, in Composite Marine Propellers, the parties 
contracted around the statute139 which expressly excludes unjust 
enrichment from separate adjudication if trade secret misappropriation 
is also alleged,140 and the court could did not go all the way in 
deferring to the parties on this issue when it acknowledged that the 
claim was based on contract but made the finding of TSM 
dispositive.141  
In contrast to Composite Marine Propellers, which was decided in 
1995, with its holdings in Spitz (2014) and Fail-Safe (2012), the court 
provided even less clarity. The court did not expressly articulate its 
analytical process, essentially leaving the public in the dark as to the 
extent of commercial privacy currently afforded the plaintiffs by the 
                                                 
136 Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
137 See supra note 119.  
138 Composite Marine Propellers, Inc., 962 F.2d at 1265. 
139 Id. 
140 P.A. 85-366, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988 (codified in 765 ILCS § 1065/1). 
141 Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. 962 F.2d at 1265. 
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law of trade secrets. Thus, the court held ab silentio that a finding of 
whether or not TSM occurred was unnecessary and that merely 
pleading TSM displaced common law claims because the court did not 
remand for a determination on whether TSM occurred or for 
adjudication of the common law claims.  
The two most recent holdings raise two additional questions. First, 
was it proper to find an absence of a trade secret merely because one 
of the factors not in plaintiff’s favor? Second, what is needed for 
defendant to prevail on summary judgment on the question of 
misappropriation? The cases discussed above illuminate several 
important areas where the law should be clarified. These questions are 
addressed by the adjudicative procedure proposed infra. 
 
PART IV: PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR ADJUDICATION OF COMMON-LAW 
CLAIMS 
 
Merely displacing all common law claims would be an 
impermissible, overly broad reading of the trade secret statutes. On the 
other hand, courts cannot simply ignore the state statutes by allowing 
any and all common law claims. Therefore, a granular, step-by-step 
analytical framework is needed. 
Central to the step-by-step analysis is the proposed definition of 
the statutory term “displace.”142 To achieve clarity and consistency, 
this term should interpreted as “preempt” 143 rather than “preclude.”144 
As a consequence of this interpretation, common law claims should be 
adjudicated after a finding of no trade secret or, with few exceptions 
discussed below, after a finding that misappropriation took place. 
Additionally, as a consequence of this interpretation, common law 
claims should not be dismissed on a motion to dismiss, summary 
judgment, or a motion for judgment as a matter of law solely on the 
grounds that these claims are displaced by state statutes.  
                                                 
142 See, e.g., 765 ILCS § 1065/8. 
143 PREEMPT, supra note 13. 
144 PRECLUDE, supra note 14. 
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Discussed here is the proposed procedure for determining how the 
claims accompanying the trade secret misappropriation claim should 
be handled. The procedure includes the following steps: (1) identify 
the claims that should not be displaced based on plain meaning of the 
state statues; (2) determine if there is a trade secret within the meaning 
of state statutes and state common law; (3) determine if there is 
misappropriation within the meaning of the UTSA; and (4) adjudicate 
the remaining claims. 
 
A. Identify the Claims that Should Not Be Displaced 
 
At the outset, the easiest category of claims to identify are claims 
that should be not be preempted nor precluded—contract and criminal. 
The UTSA, as well as all three states within the Seventh Circuit, 
expressly preempt these claims.145 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit 
indicated that the category of claims that are never preempted may 
include claims that are not based on a contract between the litigants 
but arise in the law of contracts, such as tortious interference with 
contract, which was not precluded in IDX,146 breach of a 
confidentiality agreement, and breach of fiduciary duty.147 
Additionally, as illustrated infra, courts have found that diversion of 
corporate opportunities originates in breach of fiduciary duty,148 which 
would also mean that this common-law cause of action could arise in 
the law of contract.  
 
B. Is There a Trade Secret? 
 
Once contract and criminal claims have been identified and 
disposed of, courts should determine whether the information at issue 
                                                 
145 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 9. 
146 IDX Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d at 581 (7th Cir. 2002). 
147 See supra note 126.  
148 Anest v. Audino, 773 N.E.2d 202, 210 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 2002) (citing 
Dremco, Inc. v. South Chapel Hill Gardens, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 501 (1995)). 
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is a trade secret. Here, courts should consider state common law to 
supplement the statutory definition. 
It is important to determine if there is a trade secret before 
adjudicating common law claims other than those expressly displaced 
because courts, both within and outside of the Seventh Circuit,149 have 
held that this is a threshold inquiry.150 If there is no trade secret, either 
because it does not have the requisite secrecy, because it does not 
derive independent value from its secrecy, or because the owner has 
not taken reasonable steps to preserve secrecy, common law claims 
should not be displaced.151  
For instance, in Burbank Grease Services, LLC v. Sokolowski, 
decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the plaintiff brought a 
claim of trade secret misappropriation under the Wisconsin Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act together with claims of breach of fiduciary duty and 
computer crimes.152 The defendant argued that legislative intent 
underlying the statute was to encompass all claims based upon 
confidential business information, even where a claim does not allege 
or depend on determining that the confidential information met the 
statutory definition of a trade secret.153 The Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin disagreed. The court started its analysis by looking at the 
statutory provision, which provides that the statute displaces “any 
other law of this state providing a civil remedy for misappropriation of 
a trade secret.”154 Because trade secret is a statutorily-defined term, 
the court noted that, as has been customary in the jurisdictions that 
                                                 
149 John T. Cross, Utsa Displacement of Other State Law Claims, 33 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 445, 491 (2010) (citing Custom Teleconnect, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1173; Aspen 
Mktg. Servs, Inc. v. Russell, No. 09 C 2864, 2009 WL 4674061 (N.D. Ill. December 
3, 2009)). 
150 Id. at 451. 
151 Id. 
152 Burbank Grease Services, LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 
2006). 
153 Id. at 789. 
154 Id. 
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adopted the Uniform Act,155 common law claims for misappropriation 
of information other than the statutorily-defined trade secret should be 
allowed.156 The court also considered the dictionary definition of 
“any,” concluding that the breadth of this term “evinces a broad range 
of civil remedies.”157 Finally, the court confirmed its plain-meaning 
statutory interpretation with an analysis of legislative intent.158 The 
court cited a report prepared in 1984 by the Wisconsin Legislative 
Council, commissioned to investigate the desirability of incorporating 
uniform trade secret protections into state law, which stated that “the 
[Uniform Trade Secrets] Act [was] not intended to be a comprehensive 
remedy” and did not apply to “duties voluntarily assumed through an 
express or an implied-in-fact contract” or “duties imposed by law 
which are not dependent upon the existence of competitively 
significant secret information, like an agent’s duty of loyalty to his or 
her principal.”159 
Illinois law is less straightforward because Illinois courts take into 
account both the statutory160 and common law161 elements of trade 
secret claims. As to the six-factor common-law test, as discussed 
supra, the Spitz and Fail-Safe decisions raise the question of whether a 
court may find an absence of a trade secret merely because one of the 
factors is not in the plaintiff’s favor. Regardless of whether statutory or 
common law definitions of a trade secret are used under Illinois law, 
the Seventh Circuit itself has held that “the existence of a trade secret 
ordinarily is a question of fact”162 that is difficult to define,163 which 
                                                 
155 Id. (citing Minuteman, 147 Wis.2d at 851, 434 N.W.2d 773; Electro–Craft 
Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 899 (Minn.1983); Convolve, Inc. 
v. Compaq Computer Corp., No. 00CV5141 (GBD), 2006 WL 839022, at *5–6 




159 Id. at 791. 
160 765 ILCS § 1065/8. 
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requires an ad hoc evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances.164 
Therefore, the existence of a trade secret is best resolved by a fact 
finder after full presentation of evidence from each side.165 It may be 
inappropriate to dispose of the claim of trade secret misappropriation 
without answering the question of whether a trade secret exists at all. 
 
C. Was a Trade Secret Misappropriated? 
 
If the information at issue is a trade secret, there may still be an 
actionable wrong that does not fall under the definition of 
misappropriation; therefore, the plaintiff should be able to recover on 
alternative theories.166 As a federal district court located in Illinois 
noted, “ITSA only preempts actions predicated on misuse of secret 
information. Common law claims based on different theories are still 
permissible.”167  
Courts use different approaches to evaluate the elements of trade 
secret misappropriation and common law claims.168 Not all of these 
approaches may require a separate evaluation of each element.169 
However, the Seventh Circuit has not considered the standard for 
evaluating claims of misappropriation on summary judgment and 
because the finding of misappropriation may not result in a finding of 
                                                 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Burbank Grease Services, LLC, 717 N.W.2d at 789-90 (“We conclude the 
sum effect of the statutory terms is that civil claims for relief are not abrogated by 
Wis. Stat. § 134.90(6)(b) 2, with the exception of those civil tort claims that require 
the use of a statutorily-defined trade secret. It follows that all other types of civil tort 
claims that Burbank may assert in regard to the misuse of its confidential 
information remain available to it under the directive of § 134.90(6)(b)2.”). 
167 Combined Metals of Chicago Ltd. v. Airtek, Inc., 985 F.Supp. 827, 830 
(N.D. Ill.1997); AutoMed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 922 (N.D. Ill. 
2001). 
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no conversion,170 the question of misappropriation should be 
addressed separately before common law claims are adjudicated.  
One Illinois case, Tempco Elec. Heater Corp. v. Temperature 
Engr. Co., addressed what is needed for the plaintiff to prevail on 
summary judgment as to misappropriation of a trade secret. The 
standard, previously articulated in PepsiCo,171 had been that the 
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation had to be considered 
against the “likely to prevail” test,172 but the district court articulated a 
more relaxed standard, suggesting that plaintiffs “need only show that 
a reasonable jury could possibly allow them to prevail.”173 In support 
of its position, the district court noted that, first, the PepsiCo court 
considered a preliminary injunction rather than a motion for summary 
judgment, and, second, there was a need to bring the standard closer in 
line with the summary judgment doctrine articulated by the Supreme 
Court that no summary judgment can issue “if the evidence is such 
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.”174  
Courts generally agree that despite the fact that misappropriation 
merely requires intent while the Uniform Act imposes an additional 
requirement of impropriety, a finding of trade secret misappropriation 
will generally preclude common law claims that include this element, 
such as conversion, unless the misappropriated object is tangible and 
has intrinsic, independently derived value. For example, in Remy, Inc., 
the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim of conversion that pertained to software, transferred to 
the defendant’s computer via zip files and not embodied in a tangible 
medium to which independent value could be ascribed.175 It is 
                                                 
170 Id.; see also Remy, Inc. v. Tecnomatic S.P.A., 1:11-CV-00991-SEB, 2014 
WL 2882855, at *11 (S.D. Ind. June 24, 2014). 
171 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19437 at *37 (N.D. 
Ill.1995). 
172 Id. 
173 Tempco Elec. Heater Corp., 02 C 3572, 2004 WL 1254134, at *9. 
174 Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 
175 Remy, Inc., 1:11-CV-00991-SEB, 2014 WL 2882855, at *11. 
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important to note, however, that claims of conversion with respect to 
the elements that are not trade secrets should be adjudicated 
separately.176 
 
D. Adjudicate Remaining Common-Law Claims 
 
At this point, statutory trade secret claims have been fully 
adjudicated and, if there was trade secret misappropriation, any claims 
of conversion likewise have been fully adjudicated. If it was found that 
the information at issue is not a trade secret, the remaining common-
law claims (breach of duty/diversion of corporate opportunities, unjust 
enrichment, and unfair competition) should be adjudicated. Here, the 
strongest argument for adjudicating these claims separately is that the 
elements of these claims are sufficiently distinct and, further, courts 
have found that proprietary information merits protection even if it 
does not rise to the level of a trade secret.  
For instance, in Lucini Italia Co. v. Grappolini, the Illinois 
District Court for the Northern District explained that claims of breach 
of duty that are based on independent facts survive claim 
displacement.177 The court discussed AutoMed Technologies, Inc. v. 
Eller178 as an example. In AutoMed Technologies, an employer sued a 
former employee for taking trade secrets when he left the plaintiff’s 
employment. The plaintiff alleged an ITSA claim along with many 
other common law claims, but the court only dismissed claims based 
on the same facts as the ITSA claim and “[sustained] the breach of 
                                                 
176 See, e.g., Hecny Transp., 430 F.3d at 404; First Fin. Bank, N.A., 71 F. 
Supp. 3d at 847. 
177 Lucini Italia Co., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (citing Thermodyne Food Serv. 
Prod., Inc., v. McDonald's Corp., 940 F.Supp. 1300, 1309 (N.D. Ill.1996) (“In a 
situation where the alleged breach of duty does not rely on the misappropriation of a 
trade secret, the claim survives.”)(. 
178 AutoMed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
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fiduciary duty claim which alleged that the defendant breached his 
duty as an officer by usurping a corporate opportunity.”179  
As to claims of unjust enrichment, the UTSA displaces 
restitutionary (equitable) remedies arising in the law of trade secrets 
and all three states within the Seventh Circuit provide for equitable 
remedies under the state trade secret statutes.180 But even though 
unjust enrichment plaintiffs essentially seek restitutionary relief181 and 
it may be appropriate to limit punitive damages, claims of unjust 
enrichment should be treated similarly to breach-of-duty claims for the 
purpose of claim displacement analysis; the dispositive question 
should be whether the claim would survive independently of the trade 
secret claim rather than the type of relief sought. With unjust 
enrichment, the duty in question does not arise out of the fact of 
secrecy itself; instead, as one commentator noted, “[it] turns on the 
fairness of letting the defendant keep the benefit.”182 This analysis 
should be informed by whether the plaintiff took any steps to protect 
her ideas—as the Seventh Circuit noted in Fail-Safe, LLC: “[W]here 
one company fails to take any protective steps to shield its proprietary 
information, it cannot then expect the law to protect it when the 
relationship sours.” 183   
                                                 
179 Lucini Italia Co. v. Grappolini, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 767-68 (citing AutoMed 
Techs., Inc., 160 F.Supp.2d at 922). 
180 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1065/3; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 134.90(3) (West); Ind. 
Code Ann. § 24-2-3-3 (West). 
181 Web Cmty. Group, Inc. v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. 
Ill. 1995). 
182 JOHN T. CROSS, supra note 487 (“The duty in a quantum meruit or unjust 
enrichment case turns on the unfairness of letting the defendant keep the benefit, 
either because the defendant requested it (as in quantum meruit), or because the 
plaintiff mistakenly supplied it to the defendant (as in unjust enrichment). Because 
the duty does not arise out of the fact of secrecy itself, proposed [statutory 
construction, which is consistent with one articulated in this article] would not 
displace these claims.”). 
183 Fail-Safe, LLC, 674 F.3d at 891 (“But where one company fails to take any 
protective steps to shield its proprietary information, it cannot then expect the law to 
protect it when the relationship sours.”). 
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Additionally, in Hecny, the Seventh Circuit held that common-law 
claims are not foreclosed if there is no trade secret 
misappropriation,184 and the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois relied on this rule when it stated, in 
Abanco Intern., Inc. v. Guestlogix Inc., that the defendant’s claim of 
unjust enrichment was not displaced.185 The district court noted that 
the plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment related to information that 
the plaintiff claimed was “valuable and proprietary” but the court 
determined was not a trade secret.186 Similarly, the plaintiff in Spitz 
clearly attempted to protect her ideas by executing a general non-
disclosure agreement, notwithstanding the fact that the district court 
found the NDA was not specific enough. Therefore, the Seventh 
Circuit should not have dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, 
especially in view of the fact that a perfectly specific non-disclosure 
agreement is nearly impossible to draft as inventors continue to 
brainstorm and business ideas evolve. 
Finally, with respect to claims of unfair competition, this article 
has demonstrated that Illinois and Indiana courts note, first, that unfair 
competition claims are fact-specific (and therefore should not be 
dismissed merely on the face of the trade secret statutes) and, second, 
unfair competition claims are not preempted when the information at 




Trade secrets are the most frequently litigated form of intellectual 
property protection, and this trend is likely to continue in view of the 
                                                 
184 Hecny Transp., Inc., 430 F.3d at 404-05 (“The dominant view is that claims 
are foreclosed only when they rest on the conduct that is said to misappropriate trade 
secrets.”). 
185 Abanco Intern., Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d at 781 “The ITSA does not preempt 
claims that are not dependent upon the existence of trade secrets.”). 
186 Id. at 782 (“I cannot equate the complaint's description of the information 
as ‘valuable and proprietary’ with the definition of trade secrets under the ITSA at 
defendant's request.”). 
187 See supra notes 62-67. 
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fact that federal courts are tightening patentability criteria for business 
methods. Because valuable and proprietary information evolves as 
inventors refine their ideas, it is not always possible to draft a perfect 
non-disclosure agreement that would identify all of the plaintiff’s trade 
secrets with sufficient specificity. As such, plaintiffs may not be able 
to prove that their misappropriated assets were indeed trade secrets. It 
would be counter-productive to leave these plaintiffs without the 
common-law remedies displaced by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
and courts within the Seventh Circuit have already successfully 
developed the rules for adjudicating such common-law claims. In 
response, this article has consolidated these rules and the existing state 
trade secret statutes into a coherent, step-by-step analytical framework 
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